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Remarks Regarding William Thomas Turner RMS Lusitiana

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niemann:
Posted just now (edited)
The Culpability of Captain Turner - The Lusitania Resource (rmslusitania.info)




The Lies of the Allies - Google Books

See page 28 a passenger on the Swanmore between Liverpool and Baltimore did tell of receive a message from the Admiralty [the very day the Lusitiana was sunk] that to make all haste into port ot increase the speed from 12 knots to 16; and double shifts of porters and stokers were
put on engine test speed until they picked up a pilot and got into the mersey

in fact the Lusitina was doing nearly exactly what the Swanmore was doing
The Culpability of Captain Turner - The Lusitania Resource (rmslusitania.info)
Beesly also wonders if Turner’s course of action had anything to do with the Admiralty orders that are still unavailable to the general public. The fact that crew was bringing luggage on deck, remarks to a member of the US Embassy, and the recollection of Quartermaster Hugh Johnston “at half past one . . . we altered the course two or three times in towards the land; I do not know what for,” indicates that Lusitania was not bypassing Queenstown, but rather heading for it, a theory echoed by Patrick O’Sullivan.

If this had been the case, Lusitania would have had to make another abrupt turn in course after 2:25 p.m. to enter Queenstown Harbour, and not continue to steam in a straight line that Bailey and Ryan have accused Turner of planning. Bailey and Ryan’s accusation that Turner did not even consider taking Lusitania through the safer North Channel is equally unfair. As the radio exchanges between the Admiralty and Lusitania from 5 May to 7 May are still classified, one cannot say with certainty that Turner did not request to take his ship through the North Channel, only to be denied.

The Culpability of Captain Turner - The Lusitania Resource (rmslusitania.info)

Thus ironicially Turner was actually obeying the Admiralty orders when the ship was sunk!

On 27 October 2024 received the following email

Hi

hanks for your email and sorry it's taken me so long to respond.

The biggest issue for us was always the question of Captain Turner's alleged guilt. We have researched his life, let alone his actions that day, most thoroughly. Our biography of him came out in 2001 and was followed the next year by our book THE LUSITANIA STORY, which was updated for the 2015 Centenary.

We have ALWAYS maintained that Captain Turner was following his Admiralty instructions, to the letter.

On the subject of the wireless instructions sent to him that morning, I happen to have copies of the two pages of the Valentia Signal Station log. The well-known Scottish author and respected WW1 Historian Jim MacGregor and I have done a lot of work on those two pages, including successfully decoding all the messages, (which were written in Gronsfeld Cypher). Between us, we have established that they have been doctored so that Vice Admiral Coke's signal ordering the ship into Queenstown no longer appears on those pages.

The pages are written in two different hands as the first page ends unusually and the message timings at the start of the second page are out of synch. All messages following 11.12 are omitted till the ship's SOS is received.

It is our considered opinion that page two is thus definitely a forgery, a rewrite, for use against Captain Turner at the Mersey Inquiry. (We even managed to debunk the myth that there were TWO vessels with the same call sign. MFA was the Lusitania's official call sign and the Lusitania's ONLY).

As to Bailey, he was simply maintaining and furthering the Admiralty's original lies about Turner and I don't think Captain Ryan was aware of quite what Bailey was up to when he co-operated with him. Ryan actually states in that book that "Taking a four point bearing off the Old Head Of Kinsale was un-necessary, unless the ship was heading into Queenstown." (My italics).

As we know that the ship was indeed heading into Queenstown, having been called in by Coke, Captain Ryan is thus defending Captain Turner's actions with that very statement.

The work that Jim and I did on the Signals Log will be included in his new book when it comes out. When published, it will be as complete a history of the background and events of WW1 as has ever been written. In the meantime, I can but reiterate a statement oft made by the late Greg Bemis, owner and surveyor of the wreck of the RMS Lusitania. "If you want to read the usual soap opera stories about the Lusitania, there are plenty to choose from. If you want a book that gets as close to the truth as is possible about what really happened, read this one!" To his dying day, ours was the ONLY Lusitania book that Greg ever endorsed and it was the same with our website. If you haven't already read it, I'd recommend the updated centenary edition.

All the best,

Mitch Peeke.

28 Nov 2024 sent the following email to researcher Peter Kelly of Lusitina resource
Now Turner secret orders was to ram a Uboat (turning his passenger ship into a warship!)

Not withstanding Turner had no means of detecting Uboats with either radar or sonor...
If the Lusitiana at 15 knots had rammed U-20..
Would the Lustitana have sunk as well?
Remember the Tirtanic suffered a 6 foot gash from an encounter with a iceberg yet went down in 2 hours....
In wwII the USS Borie did sink a Uboat although it was so damaged it had to be scuttled
USS Borie (DD-215) - Wikipedia

Ive asked this qusestion before on World War I websites...and with your permission Id like to
reprint the anser with all due credit

PS Might as well place it on the Lusitian resource as well

29 November 2024 received the following reply:
Hello

Many thanks for your email.

Firstly, it was a general instruction from the British Admiralty to merchant vessels to ram submarines if possible, and more importantly in the case of passenger vessels, to only do so if deemed safe. There is no evidence or suggestion that Captain Turner was given specific, secret orders in this regard.

You are correct in saying that the Lusitania had no way of detecting submarines, and as the incident unfolded, we know that the submarine was tracking the Lusitania for a significant period before the sinking, and that the crew and passengers on the Lusitania were totally unaware of this.

It is not known, but in my opinion pretty unlikely, that the Lusitania would have suffered catastrophic damage had it rammed the submarine; however, I suppose it would have depended on the angle of striking and what part of the submarine it would have made contact with. I am not an expert on how passenger liners and submarines are designed or constructed.

Something to consider when discussing this issue is that vessels, such as the Lusitania, were not designed to ram submarines or other vessels, but would obviously have been designed and built to take into account accidental collisions with piers, rocks, and other vessels. Submarines were only experimental when the Lusitania was designed and built in 1906/08, and therefore no thought was given to the possibility of them ever having to deliberately ram one.

Kind regards,

Peter

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